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Abstract The ability of providing an adequate supervenience base for tensed 
truths may seem to be one of the main theoretical advantages of both the 
growing-block and the moving-spotlight theory of time over presentism. 
However, in this paper I will argue that some propositions appear to be as 
problematic for growing-block theorists as past-directed propositions are for 
presentists, namely propositions stating that nothing will be the case in the 
future. Furthermore, I will show that the moving-spotlight theory can 
adequately address all the main supervenience challenges that can be 
levelled against A-theories of time. I will, thus, conclude that, at least as far 
as the supervenience principle is concerned, the moving-spotlight theory 
should be preferred over both presentism and the growing-block theory.  
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1. Introduction 
A-theories of time uphold the reality of temporal passage and therefore take time to 
have a certain ‘dynamic’ character. For the purpose of this paper I will assume that 
A-theories of time are best characterised by the adoption of primitive temporal 
operators (like ‘it will be the case that’ and ‘it was the case that’) thought of as 
irreducible to quantification over times.1 According to this picture, A-theories all 
agree that there is some form of objective presentness in reality, but disagree on 
two main fundamental issues. The first concerns the existence of past and future 
entities (that is, entities that are, respectively, either earlier or later than present 
entities). The second concerns whether entities can either come into existence (and, 
thus, whether it can be sometimes true for some x that it was the case that [x 
doesn’t exist])2 or go out of existence (and, thus, whether it can be sometimes true 
for some x that it will be the case that [x doesn’t exist]):3  
                                                     
1 For a similar position on A-theories of time see, inter alia, Sider (2001: 14-5, 20; 2011: 
chapter 11), Deasy (2017) and Correia and Rosenkranz (2018: chapter 5). 
2 Square brackets are used for scope-disambiguation. 
3 I assume here and in what follows that to exist is just to be identical to something (or, in 
other words, that: x exists =df ∃𝑦(𝑥 = 𝑦)).  
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(i) According to presentists, there are no entities that are either earlier or later 
than other entities (‘only present entities exist’), and (at least, typically)4 it 
is neither (necessarily) the case that everything will always exists, nor is it 
(necessarily) the case that everything has always existed.5  
(ii) According to growing-block theorists (henceforth: ‘GB-theorists’), past and 
present entities exist, yet future entities don’t. GB-theorists take the ‘sum 
total of existence [to be] always increasing’ (Broad 1923: 66) as time passes. 
For GB-theorists it is, thus, true that everything will always exist, although 
it is false that everything has always existed.  
(iii) Finally, according to moving-spotlight theorists (henceforth: ‘MS-
theorists’), past, present and future entities exist, and it is always the case 
both that everything always existed and that everything will always exist. 
The only kind of ‘tensed change’6 for MS-theorists is change in the 
instantiation of a sui generis property of presentness, so that for them, it is 
always the case that one time (and one time only) is present and for every 
time t, if t is present, then t was always non-present and it will always be 
non-present (in what follows I will stop marking joint-carving temporal 
expressions with bold letters and let the context disambiguate).7,8 
                                                     
4 What we may call, after Williamson (2013), ‘Williamsonian presentism’ (of which I 
regard Sullivan’s 2013 ‘Minimal A-theory’ as an instance) takes only present entities to 
exist and yet always everything to always exist.  
5 In other words, I am taking here the core presentist tenet to be the thesis according to 
which, necessarily, it is never the case that, there is an x and a y, such that x is earlier than 
y. Alas, a proper defence of this definition must be left for another occasion (see, however, 
footnote 8). 
6 By ‘tensed change’ I mean the following: tensed change occurs if and only if, for some p, 
[it is sometimes the case that p] and [it is sometimes the case that ~p] (cfr. Correia and 
Rosenkranz 2018: 11). 
7 I am here omitting, for simplicity’s sake, other constraints on A-theories, such as, for 
instance, the following constraint on the MS-theory: if it is now the case that time t 
instantiates presentness, then, if something will be the case, there is a time u that is later 
than time t and such that it will be the case that u is present (see section 3 for some 
discussion on similar principles). 
8 Correia and Rosenkranz (2018) characterise presentism, the GB-theory and the MS-theory 
in a similar way (see chapter 5 and, for an overview, p. 168). Two differences with the 
present approach might be worth noticing: (i) Correia and Rosenkranz make use of an ‘At 
x’ operator which (although they acknowledge that in principle ‘allows for the standard 
analysis in terms of ‘[x is a time] & Always, (x is present →  𝜑)’, p. 7) they take to be 
primitive; (ii) Correia and Rosenkranz characterise presentism as the theory according to 
which (it is always the case that) there exists only one time. Therefore, at least those who 
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Truth depends on reality. One way to articulate this idea is to say that for 
every true proposition p there is something, a truthmaker, in virtue of which p is 
true. However, truthmaker maximalism appears to come at a cost that not everybody 
may be willing to pay, such as, for instance, a commitment to entities like tropes, 
states of affairs, negative facts, or totality facts.9 A weaker way in which truths may 
be said to depend on reality is by supervening on reality. According to the 
‘Supervenience Principle’, if a certain proposition p is true, then it couldn’t have 
been false without there being a difference in reality: either in the population of 
entities, or in the fundamental properties and relations they instantiate:10  
Supervenience Principle: For any proposition p, if p is true, then it is 
necessarily the case that, if p is not true, then either (i) some things exist that 
don’t actually exists, (ii) some things that actually exist don’t exist, (iii) some 
things instantiate some fundamental properties or relations that they don’t 
actually instantiate, or (iv) some things don’t instantiate some fundamental 
properties or relations they actually instantiate.11 
The Supervenience Principle doesn’t seem to require the existence of controversial 
entities and properties. It only requires that a variation in truth always correspond 
to a certain variation in reality. Furthermore, since the Supervenience Principle 
concerns the difference in truth-value of a certain proposition (either across worlds 
or in time) it poses no problem whatsoever for necessary truths, as a necessary truth 
trivially complies with the Principle. In what follows I will assume that the idea that 
truth depends on reality is best expressed by means of the Supervenience Principle.  
Consider some contingent truth about the past like  
(C) Caesar crossed the Rubicon 
                                                     
think that ‘presentists should deny that there is anything at all […] that is the present time’ 
(Merricks 2007: 124-5) may have some reason to prefer the characterisation of presentism 
offered in this paper. 
9 This problem is more acute when truthmaker maximalism is combined with truthmaker 
necessitarianism (according to which, if x makes p true, then necessarily, if x exists, p is 
true). Notice, however, that even forms of truthmaker contingentism seem to suffer from 
this problem. Just as a way of an example, Parsons (1999) takes truths to simply supervene 
upon the intrinsic nature of their truthmakers. As he himself seems to acknowledge (1999: 
334) it is at least not obvious that his account is sufficient to eliminate the need for either 
negative facts or totality facts. 
10 Two loci classici for the first and the second approach are Armstrong (2004) and Lewis 
(2001), respectively. 
11 See Lewis (2001: 612) for a statement of the principle in terms of possible worlds. 
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According to MS-theorists and GB-theorists, (C)’s truth-value supervenes on the 
way the past block of reality is. For them, in fact, Caesar exists, is temporally 
located in the past, and is crossing the Rubicon on 49BC. If (C) was false, then the 
world would be different in at least one of these respects. Instead, according to 
presentists, neither Caesar nor his crossing the Rubicon exist anymore. Therefore, 
it seems that presentists must say in this case that the truth of (C) doesn’t supervene 
on reality. This, in a nutshell, is the so-called grounding objection to presentism12,13   
All the proposed responses to the grounding objection to presentism appear 
to fall into two main groups whose members we can call (following Tallant and 
Ingram 2015) ‘upstanding’ and ‘nefarious’ presentists, respectively. Upstanding 
presentists accept the grounding challenge and consequently provide sui generis 
grounds for truths about the past. Although many upstanding presentist theories 
have been proposed in the literature, the following three appear to be among the 
most representative ones:  
(i) Bigelow (1996) takes past-directed truths to be truth-made by the fact that 
the world instantiates ‘Lucretian properties’ such as ‘being such that once 
Caesar crossed the Rubicon’.  
(ii) Cameron (2010, 2015) invokes both ‘temporal distributional properties’ 
(saying how a thing is across time) and ‘age-properties’ (saying how old a 
thing is) and claims that ‘it is in virtue of things having these properties now 
[…] that the bearers of these properties were such-and-such a way’ 
(Cameron 2015: 362). 
(iii) Bourne (2006) and Crisp (2007) resort instead to ersatz B-theoretical 
histories constructed out of ersatz times (consisting in sets of propositions) 
and an ersatz earlier-later relation. For them, what makes ‘it was the case 
that p’ true is the fact that p belongs to an ersatz time that is ersatz-earlier 
than the present ersatz time. 
Instead, nefarious presentists (like Tallant and Ingram 2015) reject the unrestricted 
validity of the Supervenience Principle and accept that some truths about the past 
do indeed float on the void and have no present ground. ‘Socrates drank hemlock’ 
                                                     
12 See Caplan and Sanson (2011) and Davidson (2013) for an introduction to the grounding 
problem for presentists. 
13 Notice that grounding objection isn’t normally thought of as targeting future-directed 
truths like 
(M) There will be a human colony on the Moon in 2077 
In fact, many accept that if nothing makes (M) either true or false, then (M) is indeed neither 
true nor false (or, alternatively, neither determinately true nor determinately false; see 
Barnes and Cameron 2009, 2011). More on this below (section 2). 
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is true because Socrates drank hemlock. However, the latter fact has no further 
ontological ground and is, thus a fundamental aspect of reality, or so the nefarious 
thought seems to go.14 
The grounding objection seems to draw a wedge between presentism on the 
one hand and non-presentist A-theories of time like the GB-theory and the MS-
theory on the other hand. However, as I will argue in this paper, there appears to be 
at least one class of statements that are as problematic for GB-theorists as past-
directed statements are for presentists, namely ‘this is doomsday’ statements saying 
that nothing will be the case in the future. On the contrary, as I will show, the MS-
theory is perfectly in position to meet not only the ‘doomsday challenge’ to A-
theories of time (as I will call it) but also all the other supervenience challenges that 
may be levelled against it. I will, thus, conclude that the Supervenience Principle 
appears to give us good reasons to prefer the MS-theory over both presentism and 
the GB-theory.  
2. The doomsday challenge 
As is well-known, temporal operators can be used to express many topological 
features of time, such as its being linear, dense, discrete, and endowed with a first 
or a last moment.15 In particular, A-theorists can take the last moment of time 
(‘doomsday’) to be the moment at which nothing— not even metaphysical or 
logical truths—will be the case and, thus, at which the following ‘this is doomsday’ 
statement is true (in what follows ‘𝐹’ stands for the tense-operator ‘it will be the 
case that’): 
(D) ~∃𝑝𝐹𝑝  
 It is not the case that, for some p, it will be the case that p16 
Suppose, then, that the A-theory of time is true and that it is indeed doomsday. What 
does the truth of (D) supervene on? Let’s call this the ‘doomsday challenge’ to A-
theories of time. 
Presentists can answer the doomsday challenge in the very same upstanding 
or nefarious way in which they attempt to rebut the grounding objection. They can 
either claim that (D) is a brute, ungrounded truth or claim that (D) possesses some 
sui generis supervenience base. As I will argue in section 3, MS-theorists appear to 
                                                     
14 Other nefarious presentists appear to include Baia (2012), Sanson and Caplan (2010), 
and Tallant (2009, 2010). 
15 See Burgess (1984). 
16 See Goranko and Galton (2015: §3.6.1) for similar principles expressing the idea that 
time has no beginning and no end. 
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be perfectly in position to meet the doomsday challenge without resorting to any of 
the presentist strategies. Instead, things appear to be more problematic for GB-
theorists. Clearly, in fact, for GB-theorists the truth of (D) cannot depend on the 
fact that future entities are not part of the ontological inventory. For GB-theorists it 
is always true that future entities don’t exist, and therefore, even at moments at 
which (D) is false. It is, thus, not the lack of future ontology that can make a 
difference to the truth-value of (D). Can (D) supervene only on the present and the 
past, and thus on what present and past entities exist and what properties and 
relations they instantiate? Although the hypothesis doesn’t seem to be inconsistent, 
it is at least prima facie hard to see how for GB-theorists a situation in which (D) is 
false could differ from a situation in which (D) is true. In order to better understand 
this point, consider the classical case of how negative existentials supervene on 
reality. In order for the truth-value of ‘There are no arctic penguins’ to supervene 
on reality it isn’t necessary to postulate a sui generis entity making ‘There are no 
arctic penguins’ true, like the absence of arctic penguins. ‘There are no arctic 
penguins’ supervenes on reality simply because a world in which ‘There are no 
arctic penguins’ is false would be different from the actual world, namely, by 
containing arctic penguins. In other words, it is by deciding whether to create arctic 
penguins or not that God can determine whether ‘There are no arctic penguins’ is 
true or false. Return, then, to (D). What can God decide to create in order to 
determine whether (D) is true or false? What kind of entities or the instantiation of 
what kind of properties and relations could possibly make a difference for the truth 
or falsity of (D)?  
One option might appear to be that of saying that (D) is grounded in the 
laws of nature (plus the current state of the world). As Briggs and Forbes (2012) 
claim, ‘[t]ruth should supervene […] on the concrete things that […] exist, the 
properties and relations those things instantiate, and the laws of nature’ (Briggs and 
Forbes 2012: 296).17 However, this answer excludes the possibility that (D) may be 
a nomologically contingent truth. But why shouldn’t it be possible for doomsday to 
occur also without being deterministically determined by the laws of nature? In the 
same way in which we accept that in nomologically indeterministic worlds some 
events can occur (or not occur) even if their occurring (or not occurring) is not 
required by the laws of nature, it seems that—at least absent further 
considerations—we also ought to accept the possibility that no event whatsoever 
will occur, even when the laws of nature are silent about this. GB-theorists offering 
this kind of reply would at least owe us some independent motivation of why 
doomsday can only come about as a matter of nomological necessity. 
                                                     
17 See Markosian (2013) on presentism and the idea of grounding tensed truths in the laws 
on nature. 
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A second option may seem to be that of accepting both that (i) doomsday is 
indeed a possibility and that (ii) nothing can ever ground either the truth or falsity 
of (D), so that (iii) on doomsday (D) should be thought of as being neither true nor 
false. The reasoning behind (iii) appears to be the same that animates ‘Aristotelian’ 
approaches to the open future, according to which future-contingent statements are 
neither true nor false:  
(i) truth and falsity depend on reality;  
(ii) if there is nothing that makes a certain statement true and nothing that makes 
it false, then the statement in question is neither true nor false;  
(iii) there is nothing making (D) either true or false; 
(iv) therefore, (D) is neither true nor false.18   
However, it is difficult to understand how this solution could be consistently 
defended. In order to appreciate this point, notice that there is an important 
difference for GB-theorists between the problem concerning the ‘this is doomsday’ 
statement (D) and the familiar problem of future-contingent statements. In fact, 
although the idea that future-contingent statements lack a (determinate) truth-value 
is not completely uncontroversial,19 it has the prima facie ring of intuitiveness to it: 
‘The future does not exist. Therefore, there is nothing in reality capable of making 
future-contingent statements either true or false. However, once enough time has 
passed, reality will make the corresponding (appropriately ‘truth-value linked’)20 
present-tense statement true, thus ‘resolving’ the past unsettledness of the future-
contingent statement in question, so to speak’. In the case of doomsday, however, 
things appear to be significantly different. In fact, if it is doomsday, and so it is the 
case that, for no p, it will be the case that p, how can it not be true that for no p, it 
will be the case that p? How can the world be ending right now if (i) it is currently 
                                                     
18 Not every GB-theorist endorses this ‘gappist’ treatment of future-contingent statements. 
Correia and Rosenkranz (2018), for instance, take future-contingent statements to be 
‘grounded in the future’, so to speak, in the sense that if ‘n time units in the future it will 
be the case that p’ is a true future-contingent statement, there will be some fact, n time units 
in the future, grounding the fact that it is now the case that p (see Correia and Rosenkranz 
2018: 109-110). Notice that this strategy is clearly not applicable in the case of (D) since 
on doomsday there is no future in which (D) can be grounded. Correia and Rosenkranz 
endorse the (‘nefarious’) idea that ‘[if] time will not go on for at least n units of time, then 
one can hold that for some m, with 0 ≤ m < n,  […] m time-units from the present, time has 
come to an end, and add that m time-units from the present, it is a brute fact that time has 
come to an end’ (Correia and Rosenkranz 2018: 111; my italics).   
19 MacFarlane (2003) is a good starting point on the recent debate on future-contingents. 
20 See Dummett (1968) on the notion of ‘truth-value link’. 
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neither true nor false that it is the end of the world and (ii) it will never be even 
retrospectively true that it is now doomsday?21,22 In the case of future-contingent 
statements the unsettledness of a statement about the future is thought of as 
something that the future will resolve. The sentence ‘It will be sunny tomorrow’ is 
neither true nor false now, yet tomorrow the sentence ‘It is sunny today’ will be 
either true or false. We have, thus, in this case two different sets of possible futures: 
the set containing the futures in which it is sunny tomorrow and the set containing 
the futures in which it is not sunny tomorrow. In the case of (D), instead, there is 
only one set of possible futures: the set containing the futures in which (D) is false. 
Therefore, the only way in which what happens in the future may ‘resolve’ the 
unsettledness of (D) is by showing its (retrospective) falsity. If, instead, today were 
doomsday, as (D) says, then (D) could never be even retrospectively true. In this 
case we would have, thus, the paradoxical situation in which the world ends by 
leaving it open and unsettled whether the world is ending.  
Some GB-theorists may perhaps reply that within the framework of an 
Aristotelian approach to the open future doomsday should not be thought of as the 
moment at which (D) is true, but rather as the moment at which (D*) or, 
alternatively, (D**) is the case (depending on whether one takes the lack of truth- 
and false-makers to give rise to truth-value gaps or just determinacy gaps; in what 
follows ‘T’, ‘𝐅’, and ‘Δ’ stand for ‘it is true that’, ‘it is false that’, and ‘it is 
determinately the case that’):  
(D*)  ~𝐓∃𝑝𝐹𝑝 ∧ ~𝐅∃𝑝𝐹𝑝 
(D**)  ~Δ~∃𝑝𝐹𝑝 ∧ ~Δ∃𝑝𝐹𝑝 
However, the problem with this strategy is that in this kind of framework we have, 
on the one hand, that (D*) and (D**) entail that it is now-possible for the future to 
continue,23 and on the other hand, that (D*) and (D**) are true also when the future 
                                                     
21 On future-contingents and the idea of ‘retrospective truth’ see, among many others, 
MacFarlane (2003) and Barnes and Cameron (2009). 
22 Similarly, if it is assumed that future-contingent statements, although either true or false, 
are neither determinately true, nor determinately false (Barnes and Cameron 2009, 2011), 
the same kind of reasoning would entail that it cannot ever be determinately the case that 
the world is ending. But how could the world determinately end if it is neither (i) 
determinately true that it is the end of the world, nor (ii) it will be ever the case that it was 
true that it is the end of the world? 
23 Within this kind of framework truth-value/determinacy gaps arise from the existence of 
a plurality of possible futures so that a proposition p is ‘gappy’ if and only if it is now-
possible that p and now-possible that not-p (see Thomason 1970, and Barnes and Cameron 
2009). 
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is open as to whether it is doomsday or not. Consider, then, the scenario in which it 
is open and unsettled whether it is doomsday and then time keeps on passing for a 
little bit longer. If that was the case, it would follow from this account that it is true 
to say that it was doomsday some time ago, which of course, cannot be the case. 
As a third option, GB-theorists may consider the possibility of simply biting 
the bullet and taking doomsday to be impossible. However, this option strikes one 
as too costly. Not only does the end of time seems to be a clear metaphysical 
possibility, but it is even something that contemporary physics doesn’t appear to be 
in position to rule out about the actual world.24 Furthermore, recall that here we are 
considering whether GB-theorists are really better off than presentists when it 
comes to the challenges posed by the Supervenience Principle. According to this 
option, the price that GB-theorists have to pay is to commit themselves to a certain 
substantial thesis concerning the topology of time. However, it is not at all clear 
that such a commitment should be preferable to either the position of sui generis 
truthmakers or the rejection of the unrestricted validity of the Supervenience 
Principle. 
As I have argued, invoking (i) laws of nature, (ii) truth-value (or 
determinacy) gaps, or (iii) the impossibility of doomsday don’t seem to be live 
options for GB-theorists. It seems, thus, that the only remaining option is that of 
following presentists and employing one of their responses to the grounding 
objection. Upstanding GB-theorists may, for instance, invoke ersatz histories and 
claim that (D) is made true by the fact that in the actual ersatz history the ersatz 
present is not ‘followed’ by any other time.25 Or, alternatively, they might resort to 
other kinds of sui generis truthmakers for (D) like future-directed Lucretian 
properties (like ‘being such that for every p, it will not be the case that p’) or, 
perhaps, ‘countdown-properties’ instantiated by the world and thought of as the 
                                                     
24 In the context of the theory of general relativity the so-called ‘closed Friedmann models’ 
feature both a ‘big bang’ and a ‘big crunch’ singularity so that, according to them, ‘time is 
finite in the past, and […] also in the future’ (Earman 1995: 19-20).  
25 Ersatzist GB-theorists include Briggs and Forbes (2012) (although they don’t qualify as 
upstanding GB-theorists: ‘The Growing-Block theory does better. Which timeline is 
actualized is determined by which concrete things tenselessly exist, the properties and 
relations those concrete things instantiate, and the laws of nature’: 296). They call ersatz 
histories ‘timelines’ (Briggs and Forbes, 2012: 260) and ‘semi-complete timelines’ those 
timelines that ‘the laws of nature permit, but do not require, to extend into the future’ 
(Briggs and Forbes, 2012: 269). They leave open the question as to whether there are semi-
complete timelines (Ibid.). 
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future-directed counterparts of Cameron’s (2010, 2015) age-properties.26 Instead, 
nefarious GB-theorists (like Correia and Rosenkranz 2018: 111) can claim that, 
although the idea that ‘truth doesn’t float on the void’ is in many cases plausible 
and intuitive, ‘this is doomsday’ propositions are indeed propositions that can be 
true without being grounded in reality. Both options appear to be open to GB-
theorists, at least prima facie. It is clear, however, that in both cases the GB-theory 
doesn’t seem to fare substantially better than presentism when it comes to providing 
a general account of how tensed truths supervene on reality. 
3. The MS-theory and its supervenience challenges 
In order to understand how MS-theorists can successfully address the doomsday 
challenge it may be useful to also consider what appear to be the two other main 
supervenience objections that can be levelled against the MS-theory: (i) the 
objection concerning the ‘Distinguishability Thesis’ (Miller 2017, 2018a) and (ii) 
the objection focussing on truths about the ‘A-past’ such as ‘time T was once 
present’. 
The idea that non-presentist A-theories of time fare better than presentism 
when it comes to the grounding objection has been recently questioned in relation 
to the so-called ‘epistemic challenge’ to non-presentist A-theories. Take Caesar, for 
instance. According to pastist A-theories of time, Caesar exists and is located in the 
past. Caesar thinks he is in the present, yet he is wrong. However, Caesar seems to 
have the same kind of evidence we have when we claim that we are in the present. 
So, how can we know that we are in the present?27 Miller (2017, 2018a) has argued 
that the only way non-presentist A-theorists can address the epistemic challenge is 
by endorsing the ‘Distinguishability Thesis’ (henceforth ‘DT’): 
Distinguishability Thesis: There is a respect, R, in which any time, t, when t 
is objectively present, is distinguishable from t, when t is objectively non-
present. (Miller 2017: 187) 
However, as Miller argues, once DT is accepted, pastist A-theorists appear to be in 
the same boat as presentists when it comes to truth-grounding. Simplifying a bit, 
Miller’s main line of reasoning may be summed up as follows. Suppose that time T 
                                                     
26 ‘Count-down properties’ are meant here to be properties that say how much time the 
world has left, so to speak. When the world instantiates a countdown property saying that 
its time is over, that makes (D) true. 
27 On the epistemic challenge to non-presentist A-theories of time (also known as ‘present 
problem’) see, among others, Bourne (2002), Merricks (2006), and Braddon-Mitchell 
(2004, 2013). 
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was present and let R be the respect in which T qua present is distinguishable from 
T qua non-present. T was R in the past. However, T is past now, and so it is not R 
anymore. In other words, T’s being R is not a part of reality anymore, given that T 
is not present. Therefore, the truth of ‘T was R’ appears to point beyond reality in 
the same problematic way in which truths like ‘Socrates drank the hemlock’ do for 
presentists. If DT is true, also the GB-theory and the MS-theory fall prey to the 
grounding objection.28 Let us call this the ‘distinguishability challenge’.  
In a similar vein, (what we may call) the ‘A-past challenge’ focuses on truths 
about the past position of the moving spotlight. For instance, MS-theorists claim 
that although 2014 is past, it was present. However, 2014 doesn’t currently 
instantiate the property of being present. ‘2014 was present’ seems, thus, to be a 
truth that, quite like ‘T was R’, points beyond how reality currently is (and what 
entities exist and what properties and relations are instantiated), thus engendering a 
grounding problem. 
The doomsday challenge to the MS-theory appears to belong the same group 
as the distinguishability challenge and the A-past challenge. In fact, while in the 
latter case the truths in question point beyond reality by saying how things are 
beyond the present reality in the past, (D) points beyond reality by claiming that 
nothing is the case beyond the present reality in the future. It may seem, therefore, 
that the MS-theory is also destined to succumb to supervenience problems. As I 
will argue in what follows, appearances prove to be deceptive in this case. 
Recall that the grounding principle at stake here is the Supervenience 
Principle. Therefore, in all these cases MS-theorists can simply retort that all the 
relevant truths do in fact supervene on reality since: 
(i) necessarily, if ‘T was R’ is false, either T doesn’t exist or it is not earlier 
than the time that is currently present;  
(ii) necessarily, if ‘2014 was present’ is false, the spotlight is not illuminating a 
time that is later than 2014; 
(iii) necessarily, if (D) is false, the spotlight is not illuminating the latest moment 
in time. 
In fact, MS-theorists can continue, (i)-(iii) follow from the fact that (MS1)-(MS3) 
are all metaphysically necessary principles within the framework of the MS-
theory:29 
                                                     
28 A similar line of reasoning seems to be offered by Heathwood (2005) in connection with 
the ‘Dead Past Hypothesis’ (Forrest 2004). See Cameron (2015) for an alternative response 
to the epistemic challenge. 
29 In what follows ‘𝑃’ stands for tense-operator ‘it was the case that’, ‘≺’ for the earlier-
later relation, and ‘𝜋(𝑡)’ for ‘𝑡 is present’. ‘𝑡’, ‘u’ and ‘v’ are thought of as ranging over 
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(MS1) ∀𝑡(𝑃𝐑(𝑡) ↔ ∃𝑢(𝜋(𝑢) ∧ 𝑡 ≺ 𝑢)) 
For every time t, it was the case that t was R if and only if some time u is 
present and t is earlier than u 
(MS2) ∀𝑡(𝑃π(𝑡) ↔ ∃𝑢(𝜋(𝑢) ∧ 𝑡 ≺ 𝑢)) 
For every time t, it was the case that t was present if and only if some time u 
is present and t is earlier than u 
(MS3) ∃𝑝𝐹𝑝 ↔ ∃𝑡∃𝑢(𝜋(𝑡) ∧ 𝑡 ≺ 𝑢) 
It will be the case that p, for some p, if and only if there is some time t and 
some time u such that t is present and t is earlier than u 
One may worry that MS-theorists are not in position to simply declare 
(MS1)-(MS3) to be metaphysically necessary and the corresponding problematic 
worlds to be impossible.30 Yet, why couldn’t they? Nothing seems to debar MS-
theorists from upholding, for instance, that (i) (MS1)-(MS3) must be thought of as 
‘metaphysical axioms’ (‘laws of metaphysics’)—or as ‘metaphysical theorems’ 
following from such axioms—and that, in general, (ii) laws of metaphysics are 
metaphysically necessary truths that don’t possess any further ground (see Sider 
2011: §12.5). Similarly, nothing seems to prevent MS-theorists from claiming that 
(i) it lies in the (either constitutive or consequentialist)31 essence of R-ness and 
presentness that (MS1)-(MS3) are the case and that (ii) essentialist facts are 
fundamental, ungrounded facts (or facts that are not-apt to be grounded: see 
Dasgupta 2014). In this case, in fact, MS-theorists could employ the essentialist 
operator ‘it lies in the (either constitutive or consequentialist) essence of x that’ 
(‘□𝑥’) and embrace the following ‘generic’ (Correia 2006) essentialist facts: 
(ES1) □𝑅∀𝑡(𝑃𝐑(𝑡) ↔ ∃𝑢(𝜋(𝑢) ∧ 𝑡 ≺ 𝑢)) 
(ES2) □𝜋∀𝑡(𝑃π(𝑡) ↔ ∃𝑢(𝜋(𝑢) ∧ 𝑡 ≺ 𝑢)) 
(ES3) □𝜋(∃𝑝𝐹𝑝 ↔ ∃𝑡∃𝑢(𝜋(𝑡) ∧ 𝑡 ≺ 𝑢))
32 
                                                     
times, and ‘R’ stands for ‘[the] respect […] in which any time, t, when t is objectively 
present, is distinguishable from t, when t is objectively non-present’ (Miller 2017: 187). 
30 A similar move is deemed to be problematic by Miller (2018: 246-49) discussing Forrest 
(2006). 
31 See Fine (1995: 276ff) on the distinction between constitutive and consequentialist 
essence. I employ here a disjunctive notion of essence (i.e. either constitutive or 
consequentialist) only for the ease of exposition. 
32 Mutatis mutandis (ES2)-(ES3) appear to express something close to what Cameron 
(2015, 2017) claims concerning change and the essence of his age properties: ‘[…] the very 
essence of ages involves change […] facts about change are a genuine feature of reality on 
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Notice, furthermore, that GB-theorists and presentists cannot appeal to laws of 
metaphysics and essentialist facts in order to avoid (all) their grounding problems. 
Upstanding GB-theorists and presentists can indeed claim (like Cameron 2015, 
2017 does) that it lies in the nature of the sui generis truthmakers they invoke that 
the relevant tensed propositions are true. However, the question here is precisely 
whether one can address the challenges to A-theories of time without either positing 
the existence of sui generis truthmakers, and thus, taking the upstanding path, or 
rejecting the Supervenience Principle, and thus, embracing the nefarious side. 
Similarly, although GB-theorists do appear in position to invoke principles like 
(MS1) and (MS2) to meet both the Distinguishability and the A-past challenge, 
there appears to be no principle corresponding to (MS3) that may help GB-theorists 
with the doomsday challenge. In fact, it seems that such a principle could help GB-
theorists only by making doomsday something that can only happen by necessity 
once the block has grown in a certain way. It is, however, difficult to see what these 
necessitating circumstances may be. 
Miller (2017, 2018) claims that any non-presentist A-theorists aiming at 
doing better than presentists when it comes to truthmaking should comply with the 
following two theses: 
Unified Truthmaker Thesis 1 (UTT1): ‘the sorts of truthmakers […] for 
present-tensed propositions are the same as the sorts of truthmakers […] for 
past-tensed propositions’ (Miller 2018: 235; my italics) 
Unified Truthmaker Thesis 2 (UTT2): ‘Whatever kind of thing actually 
makes true some past-tensed truth, P, is the kind of thing that makes true every 
actual past-tensed truth.’  (Miller 2017: 190; my italics) 
However, the MS-theory appears to have no problems concerning (UTT1) and 
(UTT2) (understood in terms of supervenience) once the notion of ‘tensed truth’ is 
disambiguated. In fact, MS-theorists (as defined in this paper) can distinguish 
between two kinds of tenses:33 one that is reducible to quantification over times and 
                                                     
my view […] The difference between my view and the Stuck Spotlight view is that 
temporal passage results from the natures of things.’ Cameron (2017: 819; italics mine). 
33 According to Sider (2001), they must: ‘the defender of the growing block universe must 
accept two senses of the tenses. One sense is given an eternalist-style analysis in terms of 
the manifold; the other captures the growth in the manifold. (The defender of the moving 
spotlight must also accept two senses of the tenses, one reducible to B-facts, the other 
expressing the movement of the spotlight.) The latter seems not to be reducible to the 
former, for if it were, the actual growing block universe—a dynamic four-dimensional 
manifold whose crest is in 2000—could not be distinguished from a B-theoretic world in 
which time comes to an end in 2000.’ (Sider 2001: 22).  
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one that is not. Let’s call them ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ tense. 34  Strong tense is essential 
to the MS-theory as presented in this paper, so that MS-theorists are committed to 
claiming that there are some strongly-tensed truths. For what concerns weak tense, 
MS-theorists appear to have a choice concerning ordinary English past-tensed 
statements like ‘Socrates drank the Hemlock’. They can either claim that  
(i) ordinary past-tensed statements like ‘Socrates drank the Hemlock’ must be 
understood as strongly-tensed and, thus, be parsed by means of fundamental 
tense operators (‘It was the case that: Socrates drinks the Hemlock’),  or 
that 
(ii) ordinary past-tensed statements are best parsed as (something along the 
lines of) ‘There is a time T that is earlier than the time that is currently 
present and such that Socrates drinks Hemlock at T’.  
If MS-theorists take every tensed-statement to be strongly tensed, then tensed 
statements are indeed made true in an uniform way, since every tensed truth is partly 
made true by what kind of ordinary properties and relations entities instantiate along 
the block plus the position of the spotlight of presentness. Instead, if MS-theorists 
acknowledge the existence of both strongly and weakly tensed statements, then it 
would seem natural to reformulate (UTT1) and (UTT2) as demanding unification 
only when the same kind of tense is concerned. Why should statements whose 
logical form involves only quantification over times be truth-made in the same way 
as statements whose logical form involves a fundamental temporal operator? 
However, it is easy to see that in this case there is also no uniformity problem for 
MS-theorists. In fact, weakly-tensed truths all supervene on the way the block is 
(independently of the position of the spotlight), while all the strongly-tensed truths 
supervene on the way the block is plus the position of the spotlight. 
It seems, thus, possible to conclude that, contrary to both presentism and the 
GB-theory, the MS-theory appears to be in position to meet all the main 
supervenience challenges to the A-theories of time and should, thus, be preferred 
over both presentism and the GB-theory. 
 
                                                     
34 Deasy (2015) considers an operator reductionist version of the MS-theory according to 
which tensed statements can be reduced to quantification over times and the property of 
being present. The kind of MS-theory featuring in this paper is (by definition) not an 
operator reductionist one. However, what I am saying here about strong and weak tense 
seems to hold—mutatis mutandis—also for Deasy’s ‘moderate tense’ (as we may call it). 
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4. Past record and Neutrality 
In the previous section I have argued that the metaphysical axioms of the MS-theory 
shape the space of metaphysical possibility in a way that puts MS-theorists in 
position to address all the supervenience challenges reviewed in this paper. 
However, even those who agree with what has been said thus far may still be 
worried by the fact that MS-theorists must reject Past Record (Cameron 2015: 64): 
Past Record: If something was the case, then it is the case in the past 
In fact, even if 2014 was present, it is not part of the past block of reality that 2014 
is present. Similarly, T was R. However, T is now part of the past block of reality 
without being R. According to Miller (2017, 2018), the rejection of Past Record is 
intimately related to the truthmaking problems of non-presentists. However, if what 
I have argued in the previous section is on the right track, the failure of Past Record 
doesn’t appear to engender any supervenience objection to the MS-theory, as it 
doesn’t prevent tensed truths from supervening on reality (and in a way that 
conforms with Miller’s unification principles). The only potential problem for MS-
theorists that may hide behind the failure of Past Record appears to concern the 
issue of whether the MS-theory adequately captures the reality of temporal passage.  
Kit Fine (2005) famously distinguishes between standard and non-standard 
versions of tense-realism. He calls ‘presentism’ the standard version of realism. 
However, this label seems to be potentially misleading given that GB-theorists and 
MS-theorists also appear to be in position to endorse Fine’s ‘presentism’.35 To avoid 
confusion I will use ‘Fine-presentism’ to refer to standard realism about tense in 
Fine’s sense. Fine-presentism is characterised by the rejection of the Neutrality 
principle: 
Neutrality: No time is privileged, the tensed facts that constitute reality are 
not oriented towards one time as opposed to another. (Fine 2005: 271)  
Leaving aside Fine’s reference to tensed facts,36 a plausible way to understand the 
meaning of Neutrality appears to be the following. Those who uphold the reality of 
temporal passage embrace the idea that a certain kind of change occurs in reality: 
presentists think that entities begin and cease to exist and change their properties 
and relations; GB-theorists think that the block of reality grows; MS-theorists think 
that the spotlight of the present ‘moves’ along the block. At every ‘stage’ of 
                                                     
35 See Loss (2017: 219-20). 
36 Fine (2005) explicitly takes tense-realists not to be committed to the existence of entities 
like tensed facts. See Loss (2018) for some discussion.  
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temporal passage reality is in a certain way: for presentists, such that only certain 
entities exist and instantiate only certain properties and relations; for GB-theorists, 
such that a certain moment is the latest moment on the block; for MS-theorists, such 
the spotlight of presentness illuminates a certain specific time. Fine-presentists 
appear, thus, to be best understood as theorists who take reality to be always 
exhausted by a single stage of temporal passage, so to speak.37 For instance, for 
MS-theorists endorsing Fine-presentism, from the fact that it is now part of the 
current stage of temporal passage that 2019 is present it follows that it is indeed part 
of reality that 2019 is present. However, from the fact that 2014 was present at a 
past stage of temporal passage it doesn’t follow that it is part of reality that 2014 is 
present. The presentness of 2014 is not part of reality anymore. What is part of 
reality is that 2014 was present. It seems, therefore, that Neutrality can be better 
reformulated as follows: 
Neutrality*: No stage of temporal passage is privileged. Reality is not 
oriented towards one stage of temporal passage as opposed to another. 
Non-standard realists embrace Neutrality* and claim, thus, that every stage of 
temporal passage is part of reality. However, they endorse a different conception of 
reality. External relativists embrace the view that the most fundamental notion of 
reality is not absolute but always irreducibly relative to a certain temporal 
standpoint. Therefore, they claim that the presentness of 2014 is indeed real but 
only relative to a certain perspectival standpoint. Instead, fragmentalists think that 
every stage of temporal passage is real simpliciter, but deny that chunks of reality 
‘agglomerate’, so to speak, so that not every two chunks of reality can be seen as 
both parts of a single, larger chunk of reality. According to them, it is part of reality 
that 2014 is present and it is part of reality that 2014 is past, but it is not part of 
reality that 2014 is both present and past.38 
                                                     
37 I speak of ‘stages’ of temporal passage only for the ease of expression. Whether entities 
like ‘stages’ exist will depend (among other considerations) on the version of tense-realism 
in place (for instance, fragmentalists—see below—may identify stages with their 
‘fragments of reality’). 
38 Simon (2018) distinguishes three versions of fragmentalism: (i) dialethic fragmentalism 
(Loss 2017) ‘revises our logic itself, allowing for true (first-order) logical contradictions to 
obtain without quodlibet’; (ii) jagged fragmentalism (Fine 2005, Lipman 2015, 2018) 
‘allows that fragments may fail to cohere with one another, in the sense that there is some 
notion of obtaining-in-a-fragment such that P can obtain in one fragment while ~P obtains 
in another, but this does not engender genuine contradiction’; (iii) smooth fragmentalism 
(tentatively endorsed by Simon himself) ‘denies that there is any genuine incoherence […]. 
On this approach, logic remains classical [and] reality is coherent […]. Instead we focus 
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One of the most interesting arguments for Neutrality* and non-standard 
forms of tense-realism is nicely summed up by Lipman (2018):39 
The closest that a standard A-theory comes to capturing the passage of time is 
in the constant rewriting of its description of the world. It states that the world 
is (now) this way. And then we wait. And then it states that the world is (now) 
this way. But the crucial bit is in the waiting, this is where time passes, and 
the passing itself isn’t captured in any of the descriptions that the theory offers 
us. […] What an A-theory really offers us, across time, are the still snapshots 
of that which passes away if and when time passes and not a picture of that 
very passing itself. A passing picture isn’t a picture of passage. (Lipman 2018: 
97) 
2014 was first present, and then past. It passed from being present to being past. 
However, the metaphysical reality of temporal passage appears to require the reality 
of both stages of the passage. A world-block featuring only a present 2014 would 
appear to be as static as a world-block without any present time, no matter how 
many ‘tensed truths’ one adds to the picture. Neutrality* appears to entail Past 
Record. If reality is not oriented towards the present stage of temporal passage, then 
what was the case must be the case simpliciter (even if in the ‘past part’ of reality). 
Therefore, if what has been said in this section is on the right track, it can be 
concluded that the failure of Past Record ought to be seen as problematic only by 
those theorists that feel the pull of this kind of arguments and take the reality of 
temporal passage to require reality not to be oriented towards the present stage of 
temporal passage. Notice, however, that MS-theorists who find the rejection of Past 
Record problematic do have the option of embracing some non-standard form of 
tense realism. For instance, they may endorse a fragmentalist version of the MS-
theory according to which each fragment of reality features the same block of the 
world but with the spotlight of presentness in a different position.40 It seems, thus, 
possible to conclude that the failure of Past Record is in any case not a fatal problem 
for the MS-theory. 
                                                     
exclusively on those cases of metaphysical incompatibility that do not generate logical 
incompatibility—i.e. distinct determinates of a common determinable, like being scarlet 
(all over) and being crimson (all over)’ (Simon 2018: 128-9). 
39 See also Fine’s (2005: 286-88) ‘argument from passage’. 
40 This fragmentalist version of the MS-theory is different from the theory Iaquinto (2018: 
5) says that may be labelled ‘Fragmentalist Moving Spotlight’ (but which he takes to be a 
form of presentism, as it seems to be indeed more plausible). According to Iaquinto’s FMS 
every fragment contains only present entities, whereas according to this version of the MS-
theory each fragment contains past, present, and future entities (see below). 
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One may retort that presentists and GB-theorists also have the option of 
embracing Neutrality* and of choosing a non-standard form of tense-realism like 
fragmentalism. For instance, presentists may take fragments of reality to contain 
only present entities (Iaquinto 2018), while GB-theorists may take them to contain 
only past and future entities. However, in this case the supervenience problems of 
GB-theorists and presentists may appear to vanish, at least insofar as supervenience 
on über-reality— thought of as the ‘collection’ of the plurality of realities in which 
the fragments consist (Fine, 2005: 281-3)—is taken to be sufficient to meet the 
grounding challenge. Suppose, for instance, that (D) is true with respect to a certain 
fragment of reality f.41 Then, even assuming that there may be a fragment of reality 
g featuring the same fundamental entities instantiating the same pattern of 
fundamental properties and relations and such that (D) is false at g (thus violating 
reality/fragment-supervenience), it is indeed the case that, if (D) was false, then 
there would have to be a fragment of reality f* in the future of g such that something 
is the case at f* (thus complying with über-reality-supervenience). Even assuming 
that this line of reasoning can be successfully pursued (and, thus, that the notion of 
über-reality-supervenience is sufficient to articulate the intuition that ‘truth depends 
on reality’) the MS-theory still appears to fare better than its fellow A-theories. In 
fact, contrary to presentists and GB-theorists—MS-theorists are not forced to 
endorse Neutrality* in order to cope with the supervenience challenge. Therefore, 
even in this case, the MS-theory should be preferred at least by those who have a 
taste for standard tense-realist landscapes.  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that there is at least a class of propositions that appear 
to be as problematic for the GB-theory as truths about the past are for presentists. 
Furthermore, I have also argued that (at least insofar as Neutrality* is rejected) the 
MS-theory is the only A-theory capable of addressing all the supervenience 
challenges threatening the A-theoretic idea that time is, somehow, dynamic in 
nature.  
I conclude, thus, that the Supervenience Principle gives A-theorists of time 
good reasons to prefer the MS-theory over both presentism and the GB-theory.42 
                                                     
41 Among friends of fragmentalism it is controversial what is the relation between the 
notion of truth-at-a-fragment and the notion of truth simpliciter. According to Loss (2017: 
227), truth-at-a-fragment entails truth simpliciter, while for Lipman (2015: 3129; 2018: 
113), formulas of the form ‘~𝐴’ (like (D)) can be true-at-a-fragment without being true 
simpliciter. 
42 I am very grateful to an anonymous referee for this Journal for useful comments. 
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